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Abstract 
This experiment “Using a Pressure (smart) wireless sensor to Detect and Prevent Tampering on the Physical 
Layer of WSN”, has as main purpose to show how smart sensors especially pressure sensors can be used to 
detect attacks on the physical layer of wireless sensors network. This is to prevent tampering and possible 
intrusion on the physical layer. We build a device to mimic a smart meter or a wireless sensor device and to it 
we add a pressure sensor and an Arduino motherboard to interpret and execute instructions. The information or 
readings collected from the sensor will indicate if the device has been tampered or not. (This can be observed 
from a change in pressure state from high to low). This change in pressure level from high to low will indicate 
the level and degree to which the smart wireless device has been tampered. We can therefore conveniently 
conclude depending on pressure level that the use of smart pressure sensors can effectively detect tampering in 
the physical layer of WSN.   
Keywords: Tampering; FSR; Physical Layer; WSN; Arduino; Security; Attacks and Detection; PCA. 
1. Introduction  
Wireless sensor networks form an infrastructure-less wireless network where nodes are independent and self-
organizing.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Such networks provide an emerging technology that helps solves both environmental and social challenges 
through monitoring and data collection related to the applications which uses them (the advantage being that 
their network can be set without infrastructure, ideal for the non-reachable places such as across the sea, 
mountains, rural areas or deep forests and flexible if there is ad-hoc situation when additional workstation is 
required. Implementation cost is cheap [10]. In recent years WSNs have become widely used in almost all 
devices which contain smart sensors to make life easy for users. The development of WSNs was motivated 
mostly by military applications such as battlefield surveillance, but today they have various uses such as: 
Industrial process and monitoring, Machine monitoring, monitoring the environment, Health-care, Home 
automation, Traffic control etc. Unfortunately it is important to note that this devices or WSNs are susceptible to 
all kind of attacks and security is a great concern  same like classical networks, WSNs if not secured they can be 
attacked and the whole system compromised [10]. Some disadvantages of WSNs are:  
 Less secure because hackers can enter the access point and get all the information, lower speed 
compared to a wired networks. 
 More complex to configure than wired networks.  
 Easily affected by surroundings. These attacks can either be outside attacks (passive eavesdropping, 
DoS attacks) or inside attacks (physical layer attack, DoS etc). 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss some recent works and research in this field. In 
section 3 we describe the system models; we further introduce some requirements and materials. In section 4 we 
give experimental results and analyses. 
2. Recent Works   
 One of the solutions for physical layer tampering as earlier discussed include using magnetometer sensors (to 
detect powerful magnetic fields which affect meter readings in current transformer-based electricity meters), tilt 
sensors which detect removal or physical tampering of meters from authorized locations[1], usage of tampering 
algorithms as part of firmware that helps ensure billing is continued, and anti-tamper switches that can be placed 
on the casing of the meter to trigger a tamper when the casing is opened.  
There are many works on security of WSNs physical layer which all try to solve security issues in WSNs 
especially that of physical layer, the following are recent works by some researchers; 
Reference [11], 2015 in his paper described that the emergence of smart meters has both created additional 
opportunities for theft as well as enabled a broader set of sophisticated tamper-detection mechanisms. 
Specialized energy-metering system-on-chip (SoC) devices such as the Analog Devices ADE7763, Maxim 
Integrated 71M654xT, and STMicroelectronics STPM01/10 integrate energy measurement and metrology 
functionality with additional capabilities on a single chip. Using these devices, engineers can create 
sophisticated metering designs with few additional components. Without special precautions, however, these 
sophisticated smart-meter designs are no less inherently susceptible to tampering than their earlier mechanical 
counterparts. As with their earlier mechanical counterparts, however, smart meters still depend on external 
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sensors for measuring energy usage. Current-transformer (CT) sensors in particular typically used in metering 
applications present a point of vulnerability to attacks using strong magnets. Placed near the current sensor, the 
external magnet introduces measurement errors by saturating the core of the CT device or otherwise distorting 
its output. Meter designers can mitigate this type of tampering by using magnetic shields or additional sensors to 
detect the presence of a strong external magnetic field. Alternatively, engineers can turn to less susceptible 
sensors based on shunt resistors or Rogowski coils such as the Pulse Electronics PA32XXNL series. Although 
the specific choice between these alternatives depends on metering requirements, both sensor types are immune 
to magnetic fields and so offer an attractive approach for mitigating this type of tampering. 
Ben Smith [12], 2014 paper proposed ways of preventing physical layer attacks by tampering. He illustrated that 
at a minimum, devices that purport to be secure should be tamper resistant. That is, the designer and 
manufacturer of the device should take at least minimal steps to deter the curious and the casual hacker. These 
steps include virtual barricades in the hardware, including using nonstandard fasteners, plastic or metal welds in 
construction, or glue in assembly. This means, of course, that servicing the device can also become more 
complicated, but remember that the focus here is on security. 
But ultimately it does not matter how difficult you make it to pry open a product. A determined opponent will 
find a way in. When that happens, there are four possible responses to a tamper attack, all directly related to the 
value of a secure device and its protected data. 
 Destroy the device. 
This may be the best and most straightforward option, particularly if the device is inexpensive but the data it 
contains has great value. For example, if a credit card terminal detects that its case is being opened, it may 
rapidly destroy any secret information inside, including the cryptographic keys that decrypt its operating 
software. Then, when next turned on, it will not be able to function because its encrypted code store is useless 
without access to the keys required to decrypt it. Any device that destroys its own ability to function when it 
senses a tamper event is about as close to being tamper proof as it can be. 
To “repair” the damage, one must replace the device, but presumably at a relatively modest cost compared to the 
recovery cost if sensitive material had been lost. 
 Send a notification.  
If a device is connected to a network, a message is launched to a supervisory computer on the network at the 
first sign of a security breach. The supervisory computer then notes the device’s identity and removes it from the 
list of active devices. This kind of device is called tamper evident: it cannot prevent a tamper event, but it can 
certainly make a network manager aware of the tampering.  
 Activate a physical indicator. 
 If a device requires physical interaction with a person to do its job, an automatic indicator can alert the user that 
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the device is no longer trustworthy. For example, there are tamper-evident seals on medical supplies that 
provide inexpensive but effective security. If broken, they alert the user (i.e. the medical professional) that the 
device’s integrity has been compromised and that it should be discarded.  
 Do nothing. 
It may seem strange sometimes to allow outsiders access to our secret information. In fact, in the right 
circumstances not everything has to be locked down tightly. If device’s value is low and if the consequences of 
losing control of its data are minimal, the simplest reaction may simply be to do nothing. Absent a financial 
incentive to tamper, attacks against low-value targets often stem from curiosity or accidental damage, and do not 
warrant recording or action.  
Reference [13], in his article review he proposed Tamper-proofing the node’s physical package as one of the 
defenses to this attack.   
Jeff McCullough [14], in his paper proposed the following: - Detection techniques internal to the revenue meter 
itself, such as the outage or blink count, have limitations. Blink counts infer theft by detecting that a meter has 
been de-energized more often than its neighboring meters, thereby implying that the customer has removed the 
meter to tamper with it or to install jumpers around the meter base. A limitation of blink counts is that they 
cannot detect a common theft technique involving live tapping of the customer service drop wires ahead of the 
meter.  
Remote detection and measurement of electricity theft is one of the challenges that inspired Elster to develop 
transformer meters such as the Elster Low Voltage (LV) transformer AGInode™ device. The LV AGInode 
device is designed for secondary outputs of pole- and pad- mounted distribution transformers.  
These types of devices have been especially effective in detecting theft associated with marijuana-growing 
operations in residential Premises. For some electric utilities, such operations Account for 99 percent of 
electricity theft. This more definitive theft detection technique uses such devices as the AGInode to measure the 
full energy output of a distribution transformer and then compare that metric to the sum of the energy 
consumption registered in the meters supplied from that transformer.  
After factoring in secondary distribution line losses and any unmetered loads, such as streetlights, the full output 
of the transformer should roughly equal the consumption of customer meters. Missing energy is direct proof that 
one or more customers are stealing. With transformer meters and energy inventorying, theft can be positively 
identified and isolated down to the distribution transformer serving the offending customer. Regardless of how 
the theft is attempted — meter tampering, meter inverting, jumpers around the meter, tapping in ahead of the 
meter — transformer measuring will detect the missing energy that represents theft.  
By comparing location data with other incidental evidence such as blink counts or unusual consumption 
patterns, the utility can easily narrow down the list of accounts to be investigated before sending a technician 
into the field. 
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Table 1: Comparison in-terms of time, cost and implementation between other methods and our proposed 
method 
 Time consuming Cost effective  Ease to implement  
Nonstandard fasteners 
plastic or metal welds 
slow expensive complicated 
Tamper proofing the 
nodes 
fast expensive easy 
Using magnetic shields 
and sensors 
fast expensive Not easy 
Installed jumpers 
around the meter base 
and blink counts 
fast expensive Not easy 
Using force resistant  
sensors 
Real time Relatively cheap Relatively easy 
 
Comparing the different solutions from other researchers to secure physical layer we noted more needs to be 
done, it is for this reasons we decided to propose another method, easy and cost effective to secure WSN 
physical layer from tampering attacks. Based on this we decided to carry out an experiment that would prove 
that we can also use pressure sensors to detect tampering in WSN devices such as smart meters and other 
appliances etc. The said experiment is based on ways to secure the smart meter from attacks such as tampering 
which is one of the most basic attacks on WSN’s physical layer.  Theoretically the solution consists of 
integrating smart sensors to monitor the state of the physical layer, this sounds easy, and our task consists of 
introducing a smart wireless sensor to these devices. Many researches on ways to prevent attacks on the physical 
layer of WSN by tampering mechanism are ongoing. Our first experiment is building a prototype for 
implementing security measures to keep the physical layer more secure. The experiment consists of linking 
devices such as: Bluetooth, pressure sensor, Arduino motherboard, LED (light emission diode), adapter, 
capacitor etc. 
3. System Models, Requirements and Design Goals 
3.1. Simple Circuitry (Architecture) 
 
Figure 1: architecture (circuit Model) 
Micro-controller 
Wireless 
communication 
Sensors 
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Devices such as sensors, and wireless communication channels such as Bluetooth devices are connected to a 
smart processor whose main objective is to process and collect information it receives from the sensors and 
other nodes in real time, and to send this information to a base station or command station. 
3.2. Components and Materials Needed for the Experiment (Basic Requirements) 
Firstly, we started the experiment by obtaining and gathering materials we need to achieve the expected results.  
The following devices are primordial for this experiment: 
 Arduino: It is a micro-controller use for building digital devices and interactive objects that can sense 
and control objects in the physical world [8, 9]. One of its main advantage is that it is very easy to use 
and setup, designed to make applications, interactive controls or environment and easily adaptive. The 
hardware consists of a board designed around an 8-bit micro-controller, or a 32-bit ARM. 
 Force Sensitive Resistor: A resistor that changes with time. Even though there are various types of 
force sensors, the force sensing resistors are having several advantages such as thin size (less than 
0.5mm), very low cost and are also good shock resistance. The only disadvantage of FSR sensors is 
low precision, there will be approximately 10% or more difference in measurement results [15]. 
 Bluetooth HC-05/HC-06: Is a wireless technology standard for exchanging data over short distances 
(using short-wavelength UHF radio waves in the ISM band from 2.4 to 2.485 GHz) from fixed and 
mobile devices and building personal area networks (PANs) [16]. 
 Breadboard: A breadboard is construction base for prototyping electronics circuiting. 
7.5KOhm&221KOhm Resistors: A resistor is a passive two terminal electrical components that 
implements electrical resistance as a circuit element [7]. 
 LED: A light diode which is used to give an   indication.  
 Android device or system: An android device is needed     such as a cell phone or tablets etc. a 
Bluetooth application or software is downloaded from the phone store and later install on the android 
phone, this will help facilitate communication between the micro-controller and the FSR. 
3.3. Methods, Circuits and Connections (Bluetooth Circuitry)  
Our method to solve tempering (mostly on the physical layer) in WSN devices consist of introducing a FSR to 
the physical layer of WSN, this FSR is a sensor which is sensitive to a very minute change in pressure or force 
hence making it a suitable choice for this experiment. Added to this is a micro-controller specifically Arduino 
and these components are interconnected to one another.   
The circuit connection was a simple one; we first established communication channels between the Bluetooth 
and the Arduino motherboard; we then linked our android device to the Arduino motherboard with the help of 
the Bluetooth connection. The specific pin combination is summarized in the Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Showing Pin connection between Arduino and Bluetooth device 
Arduino Pins Bluetooth Pins 
RX (Pin 0) TX 
X (Pin 1) T RX 
5V VCC 
GND GND 
 
Connect a LED negative to GND of Arduino and positive to pin 13 with a resistance valued between 220Ω – 
1KΩ. And you’re done with the circuit Bluetooth Pins. 
The devices are interconnected one to another in a simple circuit. Then codes for both the Bluetooth and FSR 
are uploaded to the Arduino motherboard. 
4. Results and Analysis   
The results for this experiment was to verify if sensors (pressure/force) could be used to protect the physical 
layer against attacks such as tampering  which are mostly physical and very difficult to detect, HC 05/06 works 
on serial communication. Here the android application is designed sending serial data to the Bluetooth module 
when Pressure is exerted on the Force sensitive resistor when it is pressed. The Bluetooth module at other end 
receives the data and send to Arduino through the TX pin of Bluetooth module (RX pin of Arduino). The Code 
fed to Arduino checks the received data and compares. If received data is 0 or less than 100 the LED turns OFF. 
The experiment proved that a force sensor can detect tempering on physical layer of WSN devices due to the 
change in force or pressure difference on the FSR, we conducted further experiments and built a prototype 
device in which we inserted a Force sensitive sensor (pressure sensor) on its lid. A change of pressure from 0 to 
a higher value helps us know if at a given point the device has been tampered. A high pressure indicates the 
device has not been tempered while a low pressure indicates the device has been tempered. Hence meaning this 
technique can be effectively used to bring some level of security to the physical layer by acting as a warning 
whenever an intruder tries to get into a smart meter physically. 
NOTE: The pressure exerted on the Force sensitive sensor when the lid is closed and when it is open is different. 
As such tempering on the physical layer of the WSN can easily be detected.  
The FSR changes its resistance with force. It ranges from near infinite when not being touched, to under 
300ohms when pressed hard. So, we can measure that change using one of the Arduino analog inputs. But to do 
that we need a fixed resistor that we can use for the comparison (We are using a 10K resistor). This is called a 
voltage divider and divides the 5v between the FSR and the resistor. The analog read on your Arduino is 
basically a voltage meter. At 5V (its max) it will read 1023, and at 0v it will read 0. So, we can measure how 
much voltage is on the FSR using the analog Read and we will have our force reading. The reading from the 
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FSR will help us know if there was intrusion or tampering on the physical layer. 
4.1. Data Analysis (Detail Analysis) 
We use PCA (Principal Component Analysis) to analyze how long it takes in terms of time for the force to 
change from a high value which means secure to a low value which means tampered, in this analysis we 
estimated that it takes a total of 0.00001micro seconds to change from one pressure value to another. A portion 
of the data analysis is as follows: 
In Table 3 below we considered three forces F1, F2, F3 with random values representing the forces exerted at a 
given constant time T. 
Table 3: sample data (random Pressure values) for PCA analysis 
F1 F2 F3 Time(T) 
0 20 1000 0.00001 
300 5000 4 0.00001 
10 600 1 0.00001 
50 0 90 0.00001 
1000 0 0 0.00001 
100 5 2000 0.00001 
500 1 50 0.00001 
100 0 10 0.00001 
50 100 800 0.00001 
0 600 0 0.00001 
20 1 500 0.00001 
 
4.2. Summary Statistics(Supplementary Observations) 
Table 4: detail summary 
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F1 10 0 10 0.000 1000.000 208.000 321.517 
F2 10 0 10 0.000 5000.000 622.700 1557.879 
F3 10 0 10 0.000 2000.000 365.500 660.371 
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Table 5: Supplementary observations 
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F1 1 0 1 50.000 50.000 50.000  
F2 1 0 1 100.000 100.000 100.000  
F3 1 0 1 800.000 800.000 800.000  
Table 6: correlation matrix (Pearson (n)) 
Variable F1 F2 F3 
F1 1 0.047 -0.271 
F2 0.047 1 -0.240 
F3 -0.271 -0.240 1 
4.3. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
4.3.1. Eigen values 
Table 7: Eigen values 
  F1 F2 F3 
Eigen value 1.387 0.953 0.660 
Variability 
(%) 
46.219 31.779 22.002 
Cumulative 
(%) 
46.219 77.998 100.000 
 
Figure 2: Eigen value / cumulative variable 
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4.3.2 Eigenvectors 
Table 8: Eigenvectors 
 F1 F2 F3 
F1 -0.540 -0.661 0.521 
F2 -0.491 0.750 0.444 
F3 0.684 0.016 0.729 
Table 9: factor loading 
 F1 F2 F3 
F1 -0.636 -0.646 0.423 
F2 -0.578 0.732 0.360 
F3 0.805 0.016 0.593 
Table 10: correlation between variables and factors 
 F1 F2 F3 
F1 -0.636 -0.646 0.423 
F2 -0.578 0.732 0.360 
F3 0.805 0.016 0.593 
 
 
Figure 3: F1 / F2 variables 
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Figure 4: F1 / F2 observations 
 
Figure 5: F1 / F2 Biplot 
Table 11: Contribution of the observations (%) 
 F1 F2 F3 
0.00001 11.467 0.274 0.622 
0.00001 29.166 42.476 16.701 
0.00001 0.012 1.749 8.966 
0.00001 0.248 0.004 9.157 
0.00001 18.320 43.760 8.300 
0.00001 34.297 0.014 35.605 
0.00001 3.092 9.601 0.046 
0.00001 0.001 0.087 9.340 
0.00001 0.004 1.939 9.396 
0.00001 3.394 0.096 1.867 
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Table 12: squared cosines of the observation 
 F1 F2 F3 
0.00001 0.959 0.016 0.025 
0.00001 0.440 0.440 0.120 
0.00001 0.002 0.219 0.779 
0.00001 0.054 0.001 0.946 
0.00001 0.350 0.575 0.075 
0.00001 0.669 0.000 0.331 
0.00001 0.318 0.679 0.002 
0.00001 0.000 0.013 0.987 
0.00001 0.001 0.229 0.770 
0.00001 0.780 0.015 0.204 
0.00001 0.984 0.009 0.007 
 
The results corresponding to the supplementary observations are displayed in the second part of the table. 
Values in bold correspond for each observation to the factor for which the squared cosine is the largest. The 
bold values mean the pressure is high; hence the device has not been tampered.  
5. Conclusion 
In this study of detecting and preventing tampering attacks on physical layer of Wireless Sensor Networks, we 
have contributed by proposing another method to prevent and detect tampering attacks on WSN devices. We 
compare other methods to our method in table1 and we discuss already existing solutions to this problem. There 
are many other methods or ways to detect and prevent tampering in WSN’s physical layer for example, Using 
magnetic shields and sensors to detect powerful magnetic fields which affect meter readings, Nonstandard 
fasteners plastic or metal welds in construction, or glue in assembly, Tamper proofing the nodes, Install jumpers 
around the meter base and outage or blink counts, we proposed the use of force resistant sensors to secure 
physical layer from tampering attacks. Some advantages over existing methods are: tampering attacks are 
detected in real time; it is cheap, reliable and very easy to implement. In the course of our research we 
discovered that our method is not only cost effective but also can conveniently detect tampering or intrusions on 
WSN physical layer.  
6. Recommendations 
For future test and experiments we intend to increase the communication range of the WSN devices. We can 
note that the Bluetooth device linking the wireless devices for communication has a limited range.    
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